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SUMMARY
Negotiating tactics can often appear harsh, but when the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) placed Canada on its Priority Watch List (PWL), the 
move went beyond the standard give-and-take of renegotiating the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.
Canada – a nation that believes in the rule of law – joins China, Algeria, 
Kuwait and Venezuela, to name just a few, on the PWL list for its alleged 
“worst” record in intellectual property standards. Granted, Canada has room 
for improvement in this area, but for the USTR’s annual Special 301 report 
to place it on the PWL is hardly credible. It is no coincidence that Canada, 
the only G7 country—and virtually the only western country—to make either 
the PWL and the USTR’s lesser Watch List (WL), is also in the midst of 
renegotiating NAFTA with the United States and Mexico.
The 301 process has always been political to some degree, but using it as a 
negotiating hammer with which to hit Canada over the head risks devaluing 
its importance in identifying genuine shortcomings in the IP realm that affect 
U.S. and Canadian businesses.
The report is on target in identifying several IP areas requiring more rigorous 
attention from Canada, including counterfeit goods in transit and copyright 
issues. However, the U.S. is also unhappy with changes to Canadian 
pharmaceutical patent regulations and protectionist matters arising from the 
Canada-EU Trade Agreement that have to do with European geographical 
indications. Still, although Canada is not alone in the latter area, no European 
country is on the WL.
Ironically, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s own ranking of 50 world 
economies on their IP standards shows that Canada improved in four out of 
1six categories, coming in 18th among the 50. Venezuela, with whom Canada shares 
the notoriety of being on the PWL, was 50th out of 50.
Clearly, Canada’s new ranking does not reflect reality and is a blatant negotiating 
tool, but the USTR appears less interested in the collateral damage it may cause as 
long as the U.S. can get the concessions it wants at the table. This is a game that two 
can play, however, and Canada’s turn at hardball may come if the U.S. decides one 
day that it wants to rejoin the latest incarnation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from 
which it so hastily withdrew when Donald Trump was elected president.
2If you are a trade negotiator, an important objective is to get maximum leverage (a/k/a 
negotiating “coinage”) in order to extract concessions from the other side or as a trade-off 
against concessions that you don’t want to make. The NAFTA negotiations are no different, 
even though at one moment they seem to be close to completion, and the next to be going 
backwards as new demands are piled on or seemingly settled issues resurface. 
One tactic that U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer uses to increase pressure 
is to add new demands and threats as the end game nears, in order to gain a negotiating 
advantage and keep the other side off balance. As an example, the U.S. announced that 
threatened special steel and aluminum tariffs – ostensibly applied for national security 
reasons because imports of foreign steel are alleged to be undermining U.S. national 
security – will be applied to both Canada and Mexico if NAFTA is not concluded soon. No 
matter that Canada is a NATO and NORAD defence partner and has been part of the North 
American defence production base for decades, and that the announced tariffs are unrelated 
to NAFTA; the tariffs were still announced, and then suspended for 30 days while the 
NAFTA negotiations continued. With the negotiations ongoing, the tariff exemption for 
Canada and Mexico has been extended for another 30 days. These “emergency” tariffs have 
nothing to do with NAFTA, but by linking them to the negotiations the U.S. has just put 
a couple of more bullets into its chamber. It’s a smart negotiating move. So why not throw 
some other issues into the NAFTA mix as well? 
It was thus no coincidence that on April 27, in its annual Special 301 report on global 
intellectual property standards, the USTR downgraded Canada from “bad” to “worst”, 
putting it on the Priority Watch List (PWL) along with countries such as China, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Russia, Venezuela, India, Kuwait, Ukraine, Colombia, Argentina and Chile. (For 
a more detailed description of the annual 301 process, see this post that I wrote a couple 
of years ago). Canada is the only G7 country—and virtually the only western country—
to make either the PWL and the USTR’s lesser Watch List (WL), is also in the midst of 
renegotiating NAFTA with the United States and Mexico. While Canada’s IP record has 
blemishes and could be improved, does any reasonable and fair-minded person actually 
believe that IP protection and enforcement in Canada is as bad as in the other 11 countries 
on the PWL and worse than in Pakistan or Egypt (some of the countries on the lesser-
transgressor WL?) To claim that a rule-of-law country like Canada, with a long and proven 
track record in IP legislation and regulation, has a worse IP regime than the countries 
named above, or than any other developed country, is clearly a case of classic over-reach 
and exaggeration, done primarily if not exclusively for NAFTA negotiating purposes. 
Even though the 301 process has always had a degree of politicization, in so overtly using 
301 to add another card to its trade-negotiating hand, the USTR risks undermining a useful 
exercise in identifying IP shortcomings affecting both U.S. and domestic businesses and 
creators. To this observer, putting Canada on the PWL at this time strains credulity and is 
unhelpful in terms of moving IP issues, especially copyright, in the right direction. 
Of course copyright is not the only IP itch that the USTR wants scratched. The report 
criticizes Canada (rightly, in my view) for a failure to take more concerted action against 
counterfeit goods in transit. In the patent area, the U.S. pharmaceutical lobby is not happy 
with proposed changes to patent term restoration or to the Patent Medicine Prices Review 
Board. But Big Pharma is never happy with countries (like Canada) that have national 
3health plans that lead them to establish price control mechanisms. The USTR is also not 
happy with Canada’s agreement to protect a number of European geographical indications 
(GIs) as a result of the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA). U.S. agriculture doesn’t like 
the GI system which Europe has perfected, because of its long history with these kinds of 
marks (think Champagne, feta cheese and Parma ham). However, is any European country 
on the Watch List as a result of its attachment to GIs? No. 
Finally, copyright in Canada comes in for examination in the USTR report. Again, rightly 
in my view, concern is expressed about the overly broad educational exception that was 
introduced in 2012 that affects both U.S. and Canadian publishers. Indeed, this is one of 
the issues currently under review as part of the Copyright Modernization Act update. The 
parliamentary committee responsible for the review (the Standing Committee on Science, 
Industry and Technology) has begun hearings and has just completed a cross-country 
road show to hear from witnesses. The committee will hear from those who argue that the 
educational exception should be narrowed because of the economic damage it is causing 
to copyright holders. The committee will also hear from anti-copyright groups who want 
to weaken the regime by further broadening existing exemptions and by rolling back some 
of the protective measures introduced five years ago, such as criminalizing the hacking of 
technological protection measures. 
The issues facing U.S. and Canadian copyright holders are often the same, although 
not always. Thus it is not surprising to find many of the concerns voiced by Canadian 
stakeholders such as the Writers’ Union of Canada, the Association of Canadian Publishers 
and l’Union des écrivaines et des écrivains québecois (UNEQ) echoed in submissions to 
the USTR by U.S. copyright stakeholders, such as the International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA), a copyright industry group based in Washington. The education fair-
dealing exception is a legitimate issue for U.S. copyright holders to raise and to be included 
in any external evaluation of Canada’s copyright regime. But do these issues merit lumping 
Canada in with Algeria, Ukraine and Venezuela, among others, on the PWL? I think not, 
unless trade leverage is the name of the game. 
U.S. organizations make recommendations to the USTR regarding the designation they 
would like to see applied to various countries on the Special 301 lists. It is worth noting 
that the IIPA recommended that Canada stay on the WL, and not be placed on the higher-
profile PWL. Similarly, the Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC) of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce has just published its own global rankings on the intellectual property 
performance of 50 world economies, comparing them across a range of indicators from 
copyright to patent protection to trade secrets, and so on, as well as measuring progress 
year-over-year. 
According to the Chamber’s study, Canada improved in four of the six categories measured 
and scored the same in the other two. Canada ranked 18/50 – not great and it should do 
better, but let’s look at the 11 other countries that the USTR grouped with Canada on the 
PWL. How do they stack up? China is the closest at 25/50. Others range from Colombia 
at no. 27 to Venezuela, dead last at 50/50. And as for Pakistan and Egypt – countries that 
the USTR has placed in the lesser transgressor category – according to the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, they ranked 47th and 48th respectively. Recall that Canada, a “worse 
transgressor” according to the USTR’s 301 report, was ranked no. 18. 
4The U.S. Chamber does take Canada to task for leading the charge on suspending a number 
of IP provisions in the newly negotiated Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP), the regional trade agreement originally led by the U.S. but from 
which it withdrew when Donald Trump assumed office. Canada (and the other 11 countries) 
had agreed to these IP provisions in the original TPP (when the U.S. was a member) 
but suspended them after the U.S. withdrew. Why? Was it because Canada wanted to 
undermine IP standards in the region, or because any good negotiator will reserve some of 
the best cards for the finale? 
If the U.S. re-evaluates its rash decision to leave the TPP (a possibility raised recently in 
Trump’s musings), it will be useful for Canadian negotiators to have something in hand that 
the U.S. wants. In fact, if the U.S. has been skilful in adding to its negotiating leverage by 
throwing steel and aluminum into the NAFTA mix, Canada and Mexico could also have a 
card to play if and when the U.S. asks to get back into the TPP, since all current members 
have to agree on potential new entrants. 
The NAFTA renegotiations are now entering what may be their final phase. (If agreement 
is not reached by the end of this week, an alternative may be a declaration of agreement in 
principle, with the details to be worked out after the summer Mexican presidential election 
and the U.S. mid-terms in November, and legislation not submitted to Congress until 2019). 
This is a critical time and the annual release of the Section 301 Intellectual Property Report 
has provided the U.S. with another opportunity to lean on Canada through designating it 
a “very bad actor” under the 301 process. Objectively, putting Canada in this category is 
hard to square with reality, but as with love and war, when it comes to negotiating trade 
agreements, the end is often deemed to justify the means.
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